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1FISCAL AND GROWTH SPILLOVERS
IN LARGE URBAN AREAS a,b
Albert Solé Ollé, Elisabet Viladecans Marsalc
ABSTRACT: This paper looks for empirical evidence on spillovers occurring between
central cities and their suburbs, both on the fiscal side and on the growth of population
and output. To test these hypotheses we specify a dynamic model with population and
output both in the central city and in the suburbs as endogenous variables and with
fiscal variables in the central city and in the suburbs as covariates. The model is
estimated with a panel of data of twenty-eight metropolitan areas in Spain for the period
1992-2001.The main findings are that the capital stock in the central city promotes
growth both in the city and in the suburbs. Also, higher growth in the central city
translates into higher long run growth in the suburbs. These results are indicative of the
potential welfare gains of both, concentrating financial resources in the central city, and
of the implementation of existing proposals of metropolitan consolidation.
Keywords: cities, spillovers, local government
JEL codes: H73, R38
RESUMEN: Este trabajo proporciona evidencia empírica acerca de los efectos
desbordamiento (spillovers) que tienen lugar entre la ciudad central y su entorno, tanto
en el ámbito fiscal como en el ámbito del crecimiento de la población y la producción.
Para contrastar estas hipótesis se especifica un modelo dinámico con la población y la
producción en la ciudad central y los municipios del entorno como variables endógenas
y con las variables fiscales de la ciudad central y los municipios del entorno como
variables de control. El modelo se estima con un panel de datos para veintiocho áreas
metropolitanas españolas y para el período 1992-2001. Los principales resultados
indican que el stock de capital de la ciudad central promueve el crecimiento tanto en la
ciudad como en los suburbios. Además, un crecimiento superior en la ciudad central se
trasforma en el largo plazo en un mayor crecimiento en los suburbios. Estos resultados
son indicativos de las ganancias potenciales de bienestar derivadas bien de la
concentración de recursos financieros en la ciudad central, bien de la aplicación de las
diversas propuestas existentes de consolidación metropolitana.
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21. Introduction
In several countries big cities receive preferential attention by higher layers of
government, often meaning the establishment of more generous financial arrangements.
This is the case, for example, of Germany and Spain, where the spending needs used in
the calculation of intergovernmental transfers are assumed to grow with population
size1. In other countries, like the US, the worries are related to the financial difficulties
experienced by central cities. In this context, many authors have proposed to increase
financial help to big cities or even the fiscal consolidation of the central city and its
suburbs (see, e.g., Inman and Haugwhout, 2002). Therefore, and for different reasons,
there is a lively debate at both sides of the Atlantic regarding the need to give special
financial assistance to big cities.
Three separate but related arguments can be invoked to justify such a deal. First,
provision costs, crime and social disruption, and other congestion-related problems are
higher in cities (Oates, 1988)2. Second, the central city bears a substantial amount of the
cost of the activities developed across the conurbation (e.g., care of the poor and
services to commuters) but only enjoys a fraction of the benefits (e.g., tax bases). This
situation may lead to the so-called “fiscal exploitation” of the central cities (Greene et
al., 1977). And third, the city’s environment must not be allowed to deteriorate because
those problems will spill over the entire conurbation. That is, lower growth in the city
may ultimately mean lower growth elsewhere.
In this paper we concentrate in the second and third arguments and try to provide
empirical evidence on spillovers occurring among central cities and its suburbs, both on
the fiscal side and in the growth of population and output. There are only a few
empirical papers dealing with these issues in the literature. There are many papers in the
literature analysing the efficiency consequences of benefit spillovers (see, e.g., Brainard
and Dolbear, 1967, Pauly, 1970, and Boskin, 1973). However, there are only a few
                                                          
1 For example, in Germany a resident of a municipality with less than 5,000 inhabitants is weighted one;
this weight rises to 1.1, 1.15, 1.2, 1.25 and 1.3 for municipalities with populations between 5 and 20
thousand inhabitants, between 20 and 100, between 100 and 500, and higher than 500, respectively. In
addition to this, the weight is further increased in the last two segments depending on population density
(see, Spahn, 1997, for a detailed explanation). In Spain , the pattern is similar but the weights rise up to
2.8 for cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants (see Solé-Ollé and Bosch, 2002).
2 However, there does not exist a clear academic position on that issue. Some empirical papers find that
provision costs are higher in big cities (Ladd and Yinger, 1989), but others (Glaeser, 1997, and Fenge and
Meier, 2001) argue about the need to compensate those high costs from an efficiency point of view.
3papers trying to quantify directly its magnitude3. The book by Greene et al. (1977)
quantified both benefit and tax exporting in Washington D.C. by using direct imputation
methods. The paper by Haughwout (1999) is similar both in purpose and methods to
ours. This author finds that central city’s infrastructure raises housing prices in the
suburbs. This result is interpreted as evidence of benefit spillovers: households will bid
more for houses in suburbs of metropolitan areas with good central city’s services only
if they are able to benefit form these services without having to live in the centre.
There is also a recent strand of literature that asks whether the economic health of the
suburbs depend on the growth of the central city. The articles that have empirically
addressed this question (Ihlandfelt, 1995, Brooks and Summers, 1997, Voith, 1992,
1993, 1998) conclude that the growth of a typical U.S. metropolitan area is higher the
higher is the growth of the central city. More recently, Voith (1998) obtains that the
positive effect of the central city on its surrounding area increases with the size of the
central city. Work by Solé and Viladecans (2002) with data of 28 Spanish metropolitan
areas during the period 1967-2001 confirm this hypothesis with European data: growth
in the suburbs is higher the better is the performance of the central city. Inman and
Haughwout (2002) find evidence that central cities’ good fiscal policies are at the heart
of this growth spillover in U.S. metropolis.
This paper will test two different hypothesis: a) central city’s services provide direct
benefits to firms and households in the suburbs, and b) central city’s services provide
indirect benefits to suburbanites by fostering the growth in the suburbs. The second
hypothesis will be tested by looking at the effects of central city’s population (or output)
on suburb’s population (or output). growth. The first hypothesis will be tested by
looking at the effect of central city’s policies on suburb’s population (and output)
growth after controlling for the levels of population (and output) in the central city.
These hypothesis will be tested for the sample of 28 Spanish metropolitan areas used in
Solé and Viladecans (2002). Unfortunately, it has not been possible to assemble a data
base on housing prices covering all the Spanish geography and, therefore, we are not
                                                          
3 More recently, some papers have developed indirect tests of benefit spillovers by looking for
interactions among the expenditure levels of neighbouring communities. See, for example,  Murdoch et
al. (1993) for a study of local recreation expenditures in the metropolitan area of L.A., and Case et al.
(1993) for an analysis of the U.S. states spending. This approach is problematic, because these
interactions may be also generated by other  theories, as Brueckner (2001) has recently pointed out.
4able to use hedonic equation methods, as in Haugwhout (1999). Our procedure
resembles more to the one used in Voith (1998) since we analyse the effects of fiscal
variables and growth spillovers on output and population growth. Since fiscal data for
all localities in the sample is available only from 1992, the analysis will cover only the
period 1992-2001.
The analysis presents some new features over other exercises. First, we try to
disentangle the two different kinds of spillovers of central cities’ policies, direct and
indirect. Second, in order to obtain some reference points with which to compare our
estimates of the central city-to-suburbs spillovers, we allow also for spillovers among
suburban localities and from the suburb to central city. Third, instead of analysing
growth in a cross-section of cities as in other papers (e.g, Rappaport, 1999b) we use a
panel of data. This allows us to control for heterogeneity through the inclusion of
individual effects, to analyse causality without having to rely on instruments of dubious
reliability, and to be more careful with the dynamics of the system by using a Vector
Error Correction Model. Fourth, this is one of the few papers focusing on this issue with
European data and from an European perspective.
The paper is organised in the following way. The second section summarises the main
theoretical contributions predicting fiscal and growth spillovers. The third section
presents the econometric model and the database. The fourth section discusses the
results obtained from the estimation of the model. Finally, the last section concludes
with some comments about the implications of the results for the design of economic
policy.
2. Theoretical background
2.1 Fiscal spillovers
Improved public services in the central city may have two different kinds of effects on
the level of population and economic activity in the suburbs. On the one hand, the
benefits of these policies may spill over the boundaries of the central city. In this case,
the suburbs may become a better place to live and/or locate business activity, since the
5benefits provided by central city’s services to people and firms can be enjoyed without
having to pay for them (Greene et al., 1977).Therefore, this first effect suggest that
improved central city’s services result in enhanced population and economic activity
growth in the suburbs. We will name this the spillover effect of public services. On the
other hand, if there are no spillovers from central city’s services, then the only way to
enjoy its benefits will be to live or locate in the centre. In this case, an improvement in
central city’s services (keeping taxes constant) will drive out activity from the suburbs
to the central city. We will name this the competition effect of public services.
a) Spillover effect
The starting point to analyse fiscal spillovers among local jurisdictions is the
compensating variations model developed by Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), and
applied by Gyourko and Tracy (1989, 1991) and Haugwhout et al. (2000) to the analysis
of fiscal policies. In this model, people and firms are perfectly mobile and choose to
locate in the jurisdictions where utility and profits, respectively, are the highest.
Attractive locations are relatively scarce and wages and rents must adjust until there are
no people and firms wanting to change their location.
Consider, for example, an economy composed by K metropolitan areas, each one
containing Jk  localities. Let’s assume for the moment that there is no commuting but
that both firms and people are perfectly mobile, both across metropolitan areas and
across localities within a metropolitan area. Individuals have utility functions defined
over a composite good y, land n, and public services, q. These services may be provided
in the jurisdiction of residence, qjk, or may spill over from other localities in the
metropolitan area (the central city or other suburban localities), qk. Individuals supply
the same amount of labour, earning wages w, and pay a rent r for the consumption of
land. Firms produce the composite output good using labour p and public services, s. As
with the case of households, public services may be provided by the locality, sjk, or spill
over form other localities in the metropolitan area, sk. The spatial equilibrium conditions
equating utility levels across localities, and requiring firms not to make excess profits
solely because of their location can be expressed as:
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where V(⋅) is the indirect utility function, Π(⋅) is the profits function and V  and Π  are
constants. The resource constraint of a locality is:
                                                                            jkjkjk Npn     . =                                                             (2)
Where jkp  is population (that is equal to the labour force because there is no
commuting), and where jkn  is the demand of land per resident, and jkN  is the fixed
amount of land of the locality. Expressions (1a) and (1b) allows the derivation of
equilibrium rent and wage expressions:
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And by inserting (3a) and (3b) in the individuals’ and firms’ demands and considering
(2), expressions relating public services to population and output levels can be obtained:
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That is, both population an output will be higher the higher are public services directly
valued to household and firms and provided both locally or regionally, and the higher is
the amount of land available to be developed. In this model there are no differential
effects of public services on population and output, since individuals reside and work in
the same locality4.
Things are a little different when one allows for commuting. This extension has much
sense in our case; after all, an important source of benefit spillovers in urban areas
                                                          
4 An important caveat to these partial derivatives is that several rely on the exclusion of land from the
production function, y(⋅). When land is included in the production function as in Roback (1982), Gyourko
and Tracy (1989 and 1991) and Haugwouth (2002) the derivative of the wage with respect to q is not zero
but negative: in order to attain the reservation level of profits, firms pay a lower wage as a compensation
for the higher rent. More important, the positive derivative of population (and  output) with respect to s is
not warranted (see Haugwouth, 2002, and Rappaport, 1999a and 1999b).
7comes through com-muting (Greene et al., 1977). Commuting can be introduced in the
model by considering  that each metropolitan area is a homogeneous labour market, as
in Voith (1991). As a result of this assumption, the new equilibrium wage will be the
same for all localities belonging to the same metropolitan area and will depend only on
public services provided regionally (i.e., sk  but not sj,k). And most important, now the
effects of fiscal variables on population and output are no longer the same: the effect of
sj,k on population in (4a) and of qj,k on output in (4b) are uncer-tain. Intuitively, this is
occurs because now people need not be located in the same place than firms and the
same is true for firms. For example, if firms’ demand for a locality raises (as a result of
increasing sj,k) and this pushes up rents, people may decide to live in nearby jurisdic-
tions without changing jobs. This negative effect counteracts the original positive effect
and so-mething similar happens with qj,k in the output equation. This suggest that, if
commuting is a relevant feature of metropolitan economies, then it has much sense to
analyse separately the effect of fiscal policies on population and economic activity,
because some of these policies provide more direct benefits to households than to firms,
and viceversa.
b) Competition effect
In the different models sketched above, all locations were perfect substitutes of each
other, irrespective of the geographical distance between them. This assumption
effectively impedes the competition effect between the central city and the suburbs. But
this result could be generated by assuming that there are mobility costs across regions
but not across localities within a metropolitan area. If this is the case, the levels of
utility and profits achievable by individuals and firms will vary by metropolitan area,
depending on the level of metropolitan amenities available: kV (qk) and kΠ (sk), with
positive partial derivatives. With this assumption, it is clear that, even if the effect of
fiscal policies was positive in the original model, the sign is now unclear. For example,
the effect of sk on 
*
jky  is now:
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There are two effects at work: the first term is the positive spillover effect and the
second term is the negative competition effect. It is important, therefore, to have in mind
8that better public services in the central city may benefit its suburbs (if the spillover
effect dominates)  but may also harm them (if the competition effect is more relevant).
The relative influence of both effects may differ across fiscal instruments, since in some
of them there are not obvious direct spillovers, and some of them are more effective
than other in attracting population and/or firms.
2.2 Growth spillovers
But not all economic interactions among the central city and the suburbs arise as a result
of direct spillovers. The growth of the central city (whatever its source) may facilitate
the growth of the suburban localities. Again, the compensating variations model (Rosen,
1979 and Roback, 1982) will help us to understand this linkage. In the simplest version
of this type of models, the different locations are perfect substitutes and population or
economic activity looses in some areas imply automatically gains in other areas. This
suggests a possible negative causality from central city growth and the growth of  its
surrounding area. However, this effect will only take place in the short run, while the
system converges to a new equilibrium. In the context of these models, the long run
levels of population and output in a suburban locality (see, e.g., equations 4a and 4b)
only depend on location fundamentals (e.g., land area, public services and other
amenities). There is no place, therefore, for a long-run causal relationship between
population (output) in the central city and population (output) in the suburbs.
These linkages can only arise in models including external effects between the central
city and the suburbs. These external effects may arise as a combination of the
agglomeration economies of central cities and the proximity of suburbs to the city
(Haugwhout and Inman, 2002)5. That is, if central cities have an economic advantage
that can not be replicated elsewhere, then the price of city produced goods and services
will be lower and/or its quality will be higher. But as consumption of city’s goods and
services is high in the suburbs (because of its proximity), they will also enjoy these
benefits.
Both firms and households may benefit from city’s agglomeration economies. In the
                                                          
5 See Blomquist et al. (1988) and Gyourko and Tracy (1989) for earlier papers that include agglomeration
economies in compensating variation models.
9case of firms, city agglomeration economies imply a level of productivity that rises with
firm density. High firm density within the same industry may lower shipping costs for
inputs, reduces salaries through the broadening of labour markets, and promotes
supplier innovation and specialisation (these are the so-called Marshallian economies).
Innovation also tends to be higher in cities, as ideas are transferred in a quicker and
more efficient way at high densities (Rauch, 1993; Glaeser and Khan, 2001). City size
also allows for highly diversified economies, an environment that is associated with
high levels of innovation (Audretsch, 1998, Duranton and Puga, 2001a). Therefore,
cities seem to have still a clear advantage in knowledge-intensive industries (e.g.,
science and technology, finance and business services, health care) or in knowledge
intensive business functions, as the headquarters of big companies (Duranton and Puga,
2001b). In the case of households, there are location factors that are particular to the
central city but that provide benefits to rest of the metropolitan area (Voith, 1991). For
example, central cities have some characteristics (e.g., commercial diversity, cultural,
artistic activities and leisure) that can attract high income residents (Glaeser et al., 2001)
and highly qualified workers that, still living in the metropolitan area, will be able to
enjoy these factors.
A decrease in the population and economic activity in the central city will reduce the
agglome-ration economies faced by firms and households, increasing the price of goods
and services and /or reducing its quality and availability. The crisis will be ultimately
felt by suburban firms and residents. To sum up, the different arguments analysed in
this section suggest that the level of population (output) in the central city will have
long run effects on the level of population (output) in suburban localities. In order to
account for these hypothesis, the long-run relation-ships may be reformulated as:
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Note that now central city’s fiscal policies can influence the population and output
levels in the suburbs by two different channels. First, directly through the effect of fiscal
spillovers, as we explained in the previous section. Second, indirectly through the effect
of growth spillovers; that is, if fiscal policies have some effect on central cities’
population and output, this effect will translate to suburb’s population and output. For
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example, the effect of sk on 
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The first term measures fiscal spillovers: the effect of sk on 
*
jky  holding of yk constant.
The second measures the effect of fiscal variables through the operation of growth
spillovers: the effect of sk on 
*
jky  through a change in yk. By controlling for yk in the
empirical analysis we will be able two disentangle the effects of the two different
channels.
3. Empirical model
3.1 Long-run relationships
The theoretical considerations of the previous section helped us to identify the two key
hypothesis of the paper: a) improved central city’s public services foster output and
population growth in the suburbs, and b) enhanced central city’s population and output
growth also foster the growth of localities in the suburbs. But the central city-to-suburb
interactions will be better analysed by having some reference point; that is, by
comparing its magnitude with suburb-to-central city and suburb-to-suburb interactions.
Therefore, we will also test two additional complementary hypothesis: c) growth in a
suburb may be also enhanced by the level public services and growth in other suburbs,
and d) growth in the central city may be positively affected by public services and
growth in the suburbs. These hypothesis can be summarised in the following four long-
run relationships:
  pjktjktjktjktjktjktjktjk fnPpp +++++++= ,3,22,21,13,12,110, ......
* ααααααα Zzz        (8a)
  yjktjktjktjktjktjktjktjk fnYyy +++++++= ,3,22,21,13,12,110
*
, ...... βββββββ Zzz    (8b)
  Pktktktktktk fNpP +++++= ,3,2,12,110
*
, .... δδδδδ zZ                                                        (8c)
  Yktktktktktk fNyY +++++= ,3,2,12,110
*
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The endogenous variables are population and output in the jth suburban locality of the
kth metropolitan area (pjk,t and yjk,t) and population and output in the kth central city
(Pk,t and Yk,t). All the variables included are in logs; therefore, the coefficients can be
interpreted as elasticities. Lower case letters are variables computed with data coming
from suburban localities and capital letters are variables computed with data coming
from central cities. The z denotes a vector of fiscal variables, including various kinds of
public expenditure, the capital stock and tax rates.
Barred variables are spillover variables, computed with data from other localities of the
same metropolitan area. For example, tjk ,z are fiscal variables of suburban localities that
belong to the same metropolitan area of the jth locality, and tjk ,Z  are fiscal variables of
the central city of the metropolitan are of the jth locality. Note that these variables
appear in equation (8a) and (8b) indexed by jk and not only by k; this is because we
allow these variables to differ not only between metropolitan areas but also between
localities belonging to the same metropolitan area. To allow for intra-regional variation
we constructed these variables using accessibility or gravity expressions, as in Boarnet
(1994). Using population as an example:
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Where pik,t is the population of suburban locality i(≠j), Pk,t is the population of the kth
central city (j∈k), dji is the distance between the localities j and i, djk is the distance
between the locality j and the central city k, and α defines the shape of the distance-
decay function. The results we report below are based on a value of α equal to one. This
value was found to be the one that maximised the explanatory capacity of the system of
equations6. Barred variables in equations (8c) and (8d) are computed similarly. In this
case the variables account for the accessibility of the central city to the fiscal variables,
population and output of the suburbs. By using gravity measures we allow the central
city to be more influenced by nearby suburbs than by more distant ones. The expression
is:
                                                          
6 We estimated the system with values of α equal to 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2. Although the Log-likelihood
function was maximised with a value of 1, the results displayed little sensitivity to the choice of α.
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Finally, note that the long-run relationships also include as control variables the supply
of land in the locality (n,t for the suburb and Nk,t for the central city)
7 and a set of
individual effects, different for each equation ( pjf ,
y
jf ,
P
jf and Yjf ). These individual
effects will pick up other factors influencing utility or productivity that remain constant
during the period analysed as, for example, climate, or proximity to big infrastructures
as, for example, ports and airports.
3.2 Vector Error Correction Model
The empirical task of finding evidence on the causal relationships described by
expressions (8a) to (8d) is subject to considerable econometric problems. The first of
them is simultaneity, since not only fiscal variables may have effects on population and
output growth, but also population and output may be important determinants of local
spending and taxation (Solé-Ollé, 2001). Moreover, if spillovers are indeed relevant,
local spending may react to increases both in spending made by other localities within
the metropolitan area and to metropolitan population and output growth. The
simultaneity problem also appears when analysing growth spillovers, since these
interactions can take place in the two directions: from the central city to the suburbs,
and from the suburbs to the city. The procedure used by some authors to account for the
endogeneity of central city’s output and population consists of employing instrumental
variables methods (Voith, 1998). The problem associated with this method is that it is
extremely difficult to find variables that are correlated with the growth in one of the two
areas (central city and suburbs) but not with the growth in the other one8. The second
problem is caused by shocks that may affect at the same time both economies. For
example, the structural decline in an industrial sector can affect at the same time the city
and the suburbs, and result in a positive correlation between the growth rates.
                                                          
7 It should be noted that the supply of land in the locality is not constant over time; we are able to measure
the land available each year for development, that may change from year to year because a portion of land
available is occupied each year and because new zoning regulations are enacted.
8 Note that the theoretical model suggests that central city’s amenity variables are direct determinants of
suburban output and population and, therefore can not be excluded from the equation.
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The third problem is that population and output in a locality will hardly be in
equilibrium in a given year. Many authors that have previously analysed growth in
metropolitan areas have suggested that these variables are likely to adjust to equilibrium
with substantial lags (Mills and Price, 1984; Carlino and Mills, 1987; Boarnet, 1994).
However, these papers use to analyse growth with a cross-section of cities during a long
period (ten or twenty years). This means that the dynamics of the model are quite
simple, and consist only of conditioning by the initial value of output or population.
Although panel data seem more appropriate to analyse local growth dynamics, papers
using this approach are really scarce (see Bollinger and Ihlandfelt, 2000 for an
exception). With panel data, the relationship between the levels of population, output
and fiscal variables both in the central city and in the suburbs could be modelled by
means of a vector autoregressive model (VAR). Different methods have been proposed
to estimate dynamic panel data models with fixed effects (Holtz-Eakin et al, 1988, and
Arellano and Bond, 1990). However, if some of the variables analysed are not
stationary, none of these are appropriate. Indeed, if some of the variables have a long-
run relationship (i.e., they are cointegrated) it will be more appropriate to add this long-
run relationship (Error Correction Mechanism) to the equation (Hamilton, 1994).
Following this approach we will deal with the dynamics of the system by estimating a
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) with panel data. This methodology has the
advantage of allowing us to disentangle the interactions between the central city and the
metropolitan area that occur in the short run from those that take place in the long run.
But this approach has other advantages: with this approach we will solve also the other
two mentioned problems (endogeneity and common shocks) while avoiding the need to
use instrumental variables.
The four-equation Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), with population and output
both in the central city and in the suburbs as the endogenous variables, may be
expressed as:
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The growth of a variable is related first to the Error Correction Term, that states that a
portion λ of the disequilibrium will be corrected each year. The equation includes
lagged variables in first differences, where x denotes a vector that includes all variables
and l is the lag order. The number of lags must be selected in order to insure that error
terms (ε) are white noise. Each equation also includes a time trend tt with coefficients
that vary according a set of fixed characteristics: metropolitan area (k), central city (c),
suburb (s) and suburb interacted with distance to the central city (djk). These trends
pretend to isolate the estimated effects from regional business cycles and national trends
affecting either central cities or suburbs. The system of equations to be estimated is
obtained after substituting the long-run relationships (8a) to (8d) in expressions (11a) to
(11d):
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The simultaneous introduction of variables in differences and in levels allows us to
disentangle short run causality (differences) from long run causality (levels). Results of
the estimation of these equations will allow the identification of the parameters of the
long-run relationship. For example, the long-run effect of z on p (α11) can be obtained
as:
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'
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and where  '23 pλα = , the coefficient of the error correction model, that measures the
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speed of adjustment to equilibrium. The other coefficients are identified similarly.
3.3 Unit of analysis and data
The model presented in (12a) to (12d) will be estimated with data of 28 metropolitan
areas in Spain for the period 1992-2001. These areas contain 537 suburban localities
and 28 central cities. The procedure used to select these metropolitan areas and
localities can be described as follows. In the Spanish case, it does not exist a formal
administrative register of metropolitan areas and the jurisdictions belonging to them.
Given this constrain, in this paper we have proceeded to define the metropolitan areas of
big Spanish cities using economic and geographical criteria. First, we follow the rule
applied by the Urban initiative (European Commission) and select the big cities to be
analysed as the ones with more than 100,000 inhabitants in 2001. In the case of Spain,
36 central cities overcome this size. However, eight of them lack a suburban area of
significant size and have been eliminated from the sample9. Second, the metropolitan
area for each city has been defined as the area containing the jurisdictions located less
than 35 km from the central city. This geographical criteria is also used in the Report on
the big cities and the areas of urban influence, carried out by the Spanish Ministry of
Public Administrations in 2001. Due to statistical limitations, the jurisdictions with less
than 3.000 inhabitants have not been considered. Finally, we obtain a database of 28
central cities and adding the jurisdictions that belong to their metropolitan areas, the
sample has 565 jurisdictions.
Population data is obtained from the Population Censuses elaborated by the Spanish
National Institute of Statistics. The variable measuring cities’s output is an estimate
elaborated by a financial institution since 1967 (Annual Spanish Economic Report,
Banesto-La Caixa)10. Seven different variables are included in the vector of fiscal treats
of suburbs and central cities (z an Z). The first three variables are the tax rates applied
in the three main taxes available to local governments in Spain: the property tax, the
                                                          
9 The cities eliminated from the sample are those in which the population of surrounding jurisdictions
represents less than 15% of the population of the central city.
10This is the so-called market share and is calculated as a function of different economic activity
indicators (e.g., phones, bank offices, vehicles and commercial activities). For the whole analysed period,
1992-2001, it is the only available information at the local level. There is a high correlation between
market share and GDP at regional (NUTS 2) level (0.99 every year) so we consider that this variable is a
good proxy of the GDP of each jurisdiction.
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business tax and the motor vehicle tax11. In the business and vehicles taxes, our tax
variable is the main tax rate set by the municipality: the common business tax rate and
the vehicle's tax rate, respectively12. In the property tax only one nominal tax rate is
used. However, the property tax base is the assessed value of the property, and
reassessments are carried out in different years for each municipality13. To solve this
problem we have computed an effective property tax rate, adding to the nominal tax
rate the percentage increase in assessed value per property after a reassessment. The
data sources used to compute these variables are presented in Table 1 while descriptive
statistics are in Table 2.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here]
The other four fiscal variables are variables related to the public services provided by
Spanish local governments. Since it is virtually not possible to obtain data on service’s
outputs or outcomes we will use public expenditures per head. The first two variables
included are operating expenditure per head and an estimate of the capital stock per
head. The capital stock has been computed by the perpetual inventory method, using a
depreciation rate of 4%14. To compute this capital stock we have used municipal capital
expenditure since 1983. Although we admit this is a short history of investment, the
reader should note that democratic local governments in Spain begun its work just in
1979. Capital deficits were huge before that date and capital investment was very high
during the eighties15. We use two additional variables that try to differentiate among
                                                          
11 The property tax is the main municipal tax in Spain, accounting for nearly half of tax receipts and a
20% of current revenues. The property tax is borne both by residential and business real state at the same
nominal tax rate. The business tax accounts for about 20% of tax receipts and is a license-type tax borne
both by corporations and individual firms. The motor vehicle tax accounts for a 15% of tax receipts; the
tax is borne by all vehicle owners, firms and individuals, and is paid according the power of the vehicle.
12 In the business tax, two proportional tax rates are applied to the tax base: the first one is common to all
taxpayers but the second depends on the category of the street where the firm is located. In the vehicle
tax, different tax rates are applied to different kinds of vehicles (autos, trucks, vans,...).
13 In this situation, nominal tax rates will give a misleading impression of the evolution of tax burden. For
example, after a reassessment, municipalities tend to compensate (totally or partly) tax base increases
with tax rate reductions. Therefore, when one looks at nominal tax rates, municipalities with recent
reassessments tend to appear as having low relative tax burdens.
14 This depreciation rate is the one implicit in the capital stocks for urban infrastructure computed by IVIE
(Valencian Institute of Economic Research) at the NUTS II level (vid IVIE, 1996, The capital of Spain
and its regional distribution).
15 For example, using IVIE’s data, the stock of urban infrastructures multiplied by more than two during the
period 1983-92.
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expenditure directed to households and expenditure directed to firms. The first one is
the percentage of expenditure on personal services. We include in this category the
expenditure in education, health, social services and culture and sports. The second one
is the percentage of expenditure on business promotion. We include in this category the
expenditure on training and job promotion, tourism and commercial site promotion, and
direct aids to business. The categories not included in these two variables are sewers,
streets and parks, water delivery, traffic control and protection.
3.4 Estimation of the model
There are two main difficulties in the estimation of the model presented in (12a) to
(12d). First, in order to check if the VECM specification is appropriate it is necessary to
test for the stationarity of each of the variables. The availability of only 10 years
questions the validity of the standard unit root tests carried out city by city. However,
recent papers have developed more powerful unit root tests that exploit the panel
structure of the data. We use two of these tests developed by Breitung and Meyer
(1994) and Im et al. (1995). The results show that in most of the cases the null
hypothesis of a unit root in the series in levels can not be rejected16.
Second, the use of a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) requires that all the series
are I(1) but also that (at least) a linear combination of themselves is I(0). That is to say,
it is necessary that the series are co-integrated or that it exists a long run relationship
among them. For different reasons, the co-integration procedure of Engle and Granger
(1987) is not appropriate in our case17. In this work, an alternative procedure suggested
by Kremers et al. (1992) is used. This procedure consists of verifying the co-integration
hypothesis by means of a test of joint significance of the variables in levels included in
                                                          
16 The only doubt arises in the case of the business tax rate (both in the suburbs and in the central city)
and in the cases of spending on personal services and on promotion in the central city. The results of the
unit root tests are not included to save space but are available upon request.
17 In time series models co-integration relationships are usually estimated by means of the two stage
procedure of Engle and Granger (1987). The first stage consists of estimating an equation in levels
(cointegration equation) and to test for the stationarity of the residuals. In a second stage the model is
estimated in differences including the residuals of the first stage regression as an additional variable. This
procedure is justified because the first stage estimators converges at a rate T instead of a rate √T of the
second stage estimators. However, as Breitung and Meyer (1994) point out, this argument is not
applicable to the panel data analyses that assume T is fixed. Also, just as Kremers et al. (1992) show, in
occasions the traditional method presents a limited power to detect unit roots, due to the common factor
constraint that it imposes.
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the VECM18. This method has the additional advantage of not assuming the existence of
a single long run relationship among the variables.
There is, however, an additional difficulty in the application of this procedure in the
presence of individual effects. The OLS estimation of (12a) to (12d) will give biased
estimators for values of T fixed and N→∞ (Nickell, 1981). But, as Breitung and Meyer
(1994) demonstrate, in this case the typical instrumental variables estimators for
dynamic panel data models  (e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991) can neither be used,
because they are not valid when unit roots are present. To solve this problem we will
apply the method proposed by Breitung and Meyer (1994), which consists of
eliminating the fixed effect subtracting to both sides of the equation the first observation
of the sample19. After differentiating the model in this way the four equations have been
estimated jointly by SURE.
4. Results
The results of the estimation of the VECM are presented in Table 3. As we explained
above the four equations of the model were estimated jointly by SURE after eliminating
the individual effects20. The model also includes two lags of the variables in differences
although its coefficients are not presented in Table 3 because are not the primary
interest of the paper21.
                                                          
18 For fixed T, the LR statistic, that compares the log-likelihood function of the model with and without
the variables in levels, is distributed as a χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables
included. These authors show that the results of this procedure are very similar to those of the maximum
likelihood procedure developed by Johanssen (1988).
19 As these authors show, the OLS estimator of the differenced model is also biased, although the bias is
much smaller that in the rest of procedures if the dispersion of the individual effects is high.
20  Table 3 includes a LR test of joint significance of the individual effects. This test has been carried out
from the OLS estimation of (12a) to (12b) considering the individual effects as constants. This procedure
will not be the one applied later to estimate the model. It is used only to test the significance of the
individual effects.
21 Table 3 also includes a LR specification test on the appropriate number of lags of the variables in
differences (∆x). We start with 3 lags, testing for the possibility to reduce them successively. The LR test
indicates that the model with two lags is preferred to the one with one lag, but that there are not big
differences between the three and two lag models.
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[Insert Table 3 about here]
The explanatory capacity of the model is quite satisfactory, with an R2 higher than 0.50.
All the different sets of variables included in the equation appear to have some
explanatory capacity. The LR tests presented in the bottom of Table 3 show that none of
them can be excluded from the equations. Following Kremers et al. (1992) the LR test
on the joint significance of all the variables in levels can be interpreted as a co-
integration test. As can be checked from the Table 3 the χ2 statistic is significant at the
95% in all the equations22. However, the other LR tests suggests that neither
neighbour’s output and population, nor own and neighbour’s fiscal variables can be
excluded from the long-run relationship. The LR test also confirms that specific time
trends must be included in all the equations. The results for the control variables are
also as expected. Land availability has a positive effect on output and population growth
both in the suburbs and in the central city, although in this last case the coefficients are
not statistically significant at conventional levels. The different trends included are also
significant. During the period analysed suburbs have grown at a higher rate than central
cities, and this is true both for output and for population. However, the suburbs that are
more distant form the central city have experienced lower output and population growth
rates.
Therefore, we can conclude that our specification is appropriate and that both fiscal and
growth spillovers are relevant determinants of output and population growth. But more
insight is to be gained when looking at the effects of concrete variables. In analysing
each group of variables it will be useful to compare not only the estimated VECM
coefficients but also the long-run effects, that are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here]
4.1 Tax rates
The effects of own tax rates on output and population growth are similar in the suburbs
than in the central city. All of them have a negative effect, both on output and on
                                                          
22 Of course, this does not mean that all the variables in levels belong to the long-run relationship since
some of them are not individually significant.
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population. However, the only coefficients that are statistically significant are those of
the property and vehicle tax rates and only in the output equations. Moreover, the
coefficients of the vehicle tax rate are only significant at the 90% level. Suburb’s tax
increases have similar effects in other suburbs and in the central city. The effect is
positive in all the cases, although as happened with own tax effects, only the
coefficients of the property and vehicle taxes in the output equations are statistically
significant. The effects of tax increases in the central city on growth in the suburbs are
similar to the former and positive. But now high business tax rates in the central city
foster suburban output growth (the coefficient is significant at the 90% level) and high
property and vehicle taxes foster also suburban population growth.
Therefore, the results obtained suggest that tax rates harm output growth in the locality
(both in a suburb and in a central city) and foster output growth in the neighbourhood.
These conclusions are valid mainly for the property tax and for the vehicle tax, and are
more dubious for the business tax. However, the fact that the coefficients of the
business tax also have the expected sign (negative own effects and positive neighbour
effects), and the significant positive effect of central city’s business tax rates on
suburb’s growth, suggest that also in this case some effect may be at work.
The results show that taxes have effects not only in the own locality but also in the
neighbourhood. The signs obtained for the spatially lagged variables suggest that in this
case the competition effect dominates. The long-run elasticities presented in Table 4
may help to analyse the strength of this effect. Since the effects on population are
negligible we will concentrate on the effects of taxes on output. Both in the suburbs and
in the central city, the own long-run elasticities are near -0.4 for the property and
business tax rates and slightly lower than -0.3 for the vehicle tax rate. The neighbours’
tax effects have in all the cases an elasticity higher than one. This high value, however,
merits an appropriate interpretation, since it is influenced by the method used to
compute tax accessibility measures. The formula used can be written in the case of
accessibility to suburbs’ tax rates as:
∑
≠
=
ji ji
tik
tjk
d
t
t ,,
Therefore, the long-run output change as a result of a tax increase must be expressed as:
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The effect depends thus on the distance between localities j and i. For example, if the
distance is 2 km (the minimum distance between two points in the sample), the long-run
estimated elasticity should be divided by two. Just below the long-run elasticity
estimates of Table 4, we include in brackets the values of this elasticity computed at
distances of 5 and 10km. The property tax elasticity computed at 5 km are a little lower
(in absolute value) than the own tax elasticity. The 5 km vehicle tax elasticity are quite
similar to the own elasticity. Note that the elasticity values are similar irrespective of the
direction of the spillover: suburb-to-suburb, suburb-to-central city or central city-to-
suburb.
The own tax-elasticity results are similar to those obtained by Solé and Viladecans
(2001). However, when compared with American studies, this magnitude is similar or
even higher to the one obtained in intermetropolitan23 analysis but much lower than the
one obtained in intra-metropolitan studies. To understand these results note, first, that
our analysis makes use both of intra and intermetropolitan variation in tax rates and,
second, that the level of local taxation in Spain is relatively modest (compared to the US
case) both because local governments have a more limited scope (e.g., they have few
responsibilities in the provision of education) and a because a non-negligible portion of
expenditure is financed by transfers (roughly 40%). There are few studies estimating the
tax spillover effects and none of them differentiate between spillover types. However,
the suburb-to-suburb property tax elasticity is similar to the one found in the intra-
metropolitan analysis of Solé and Viladecans (2001), although the numbers are not
exactly comparable because in that paper the spatial weights were standardised. The
geographical scope of these spillovers is also similar to the one found in Houdebine and
Schneider (1997), that found that the most intense locational effects of business tax
differences in France are felt at distances of less than 10km.
4.2 Expenditure and capital stock
The effects of own operating expenditure and capital stocks on output and population
                                                          
23 As surveyed by Bartik (1991) many intermetropolitan studies fail to obtain significant effects of local
taxes on economic activity.
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growth is positive, both in the suburbs and in the central city, although the significance
and size of coefficients are not the same for all the variables. In the case of suburbs,
operating expenditure is not statistically significant in the population equation and is
significant at the 90% in the output equation. In the case of the central city this variable
is statistically significant in both equations, but only at the 90% in the population
equation. Capital stock per capita is statistically significant in all the cases but only at
the 90% in the central city’s population equation. Also, as expected, spending on
personal services has a positive effect on population growth, although in the case of the
central city the coefficient is significant only at the 90%. Spending on promotion has a
positive effect on output growth but not on population growth, although only in the case
of the central city the coefficient is statistically significant at the 90% level.
Expenditure and capital stocks in the neighbourhood are also important for output and
population growth, but the pattern is different from that shown by tax rates. Operating
spending and capital stock in the suburbs have a positive effect on output growth both in
the suburbs and in the central city, although the coefficients of the capital stock are not
statistically significant at conventional levels. Spending on personal services in the
suburbs does not have any effect on output growth but spending on promotion has a
negative and significant effect on growth, although with a quite small coefficient. These
results are confirmed when analysing the effects of the central city on the suburbs; but
in this case both operating spending and the capital stock of the central city have
positive and significant effects on suburban output growth. These positive effects
suggest that firms not only benefit from services provided where they are located but
also from services provided by other localities in the metropolitan area (both by the
suburbs and by the central city). This ultimately means that the spillover effect is higher
than the competition effect. Note however, that this does not mean that the competition
effect is not present: the positive effect of neighbour’s tax rates and spending in
promotion suggest that these instruments may be used to attract firms from other
localities. The only meaning of these result is that, in the case of expenditure policies
not targeted to firm attraction (picked up by the variables operating expenditure and
capital stock), the spillover effect dominates over the competition effect.
To analyse the magnitude of these effects it is necessary to have a look at the long-run
output elasticity shown in Table 4. First, the long-run own expenditure elasticity
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(Operating spending and capital stock) are around 0.2, slower (in absolute value) than
the long-run own tax elasticity. Second, these own expenditure elasticities are much
higher in the case of the central city: 0.755 and 0.540 for operating spending and the
capital stock, respectively. Third, own long-run elasticity for spending on promotion are
very low (around 0.04). Fourth, regarding spillover effects, the effects of suburb’s
operating spending is higher in the suburbs (with a long-run elasticity of 0.2, similar to
the own effect) than in the central city (0.14 and much lower than the own effect). The
effects of central city’s expenditure policies on the suburbs is much higher (the long run
elasticity is 0.31 for operating spending and 0.652 for the capital stock) than when these
policies are undertook by other suburbs (0.20 for operating spending and 0.14 and not
statistically significant for the capital stock). These are perhaps the most important
results of the paper: the effects of public spending (measured both by operating
expenditure and the capital stock) are much higher when provided by the central city
than when provided by localities in the suburbs. Moreover, expenditure and capital
stocks in the central city provide substantial benefits (in terms of output growth) for the
suburbs. Although it is true that suburbs expenditures also provide services both to other
suburbs and to the central city, the suburb-to-suburb and suburb-to-central city
expenditure spillovers are much lower than the central city-to-suburb spillovers.
The effects of expenditure policies on population growth show a different pattern. The
variables that appear to be statistically significant (depending on the equation: operating
spending, capital stock and spending on personal services) have a negative effect on
population growth, irrespective of the direction of the spillover: suburb-to-suburb,
suburb-to-central city and central city-to-suburb. Therefore, in this case the competition
effect seems to dominate over the spillover effect in all the policy instruments. The long-
run elasticity, presented in Table 4, will help us to assess the magnitude of these effects.
Own population expenditure elasticities are lower than in the output case and similar in
the suburbs and in the central city. The elasticity of the capital stock is slightly higher
than the one corresponding to spending on personal services, and both are much higher
than the one of operating spending. Turning to the spillover effects, the long-run
elasticity of suburb’s expenditures is similar in magnitude to the own effect. However,
the effects of central city’s expenditures are really high: -0.444 for operating spending
and -0.602 for spending on personal services. In the case of this last variable, for
example, the long-run elasticity computed at 5 km is -0.12, just the same than the own
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long-run elasticity. This effect is much higher than the own effects but also than the
effects that suburb’s expenditures have both on other suburbs and on the central city.
However, the effect of suburb’s on the central city are also quite high (the long-run
elasticity of central city’s population to spending on personal services in the services is -
0.26, higher than the suburb-to-suburb effects, that have in this case an elasticity of -
0.101).
Therefore, in the case of population growth, not only the competition effect dominates
over the spillover effect, but there is also evidence that competition takes place both
among the suburbs and between the suburbs and the city. However, we have to note that
in the case of population, the magnitude of the long-run elasticities is quite low.
Moreover, given that many expenditure and tax variables are not statistically significant
in this case, we must conclude that fiscal interactions are less relevant than in the case
of economic activity.
The spillover effect of central city’s capital stock on suburban localities is similar to the
one in Haugwhout (1998), that found that an increase of a 1% of the central city’s
capital stock increases suburban house values by a 0.13%. However, as this estimate
comes from an hedonic model it is difficult to compare it with our results. Contrary to
Haugwhout (1998), however, is the fact that in our case the spillovers coming through
the operating spending are not lower than those coming through the capital stock. The
author gives various explanations to this result, but none of application to our case,
since by definition of the kinds of services accounted for in the operating expenditure
and capital stock variables are very similar.
4.3 Growth spillovers
Table 3 also provides evidence of growth spillovers among suburbs and between the
suburbs and the central city. First, the output level in the central city has positive effects
on output growth in the suburbs, but the reverse is not true: higher output in the suburbs
does not foster growth in the central city. Moreover, an increased accessibility to
suburbs’ output harm output growth of suburban localities. The strength of these effects
can be checked by looking at the long-run coefficients presented in Table 4. A 1%
increase in the output of the central city increases long-run suburban output by 0.371%.
25
Of course, also in this case the effect is mitigated by distance: this effect is of only
0.174 at two km and 0.074 at five km. The suburb-to-suburb output effect is even
stronger, since a 1% increase in the accessibility to suburb’s output will in the long-run
reduce the output of the locality by a 1%. Therefore, while growth of suburbs and the
central city is complementary, growth in different suburbs is substitutive: growth in one
suburban locality occurs at the expense of the growth in the neighbourhood.
These spillover effects also appear in the population equation. A 1% growth in the
population of the central city increases long-run suburban population by nearly 1%. As
in the output equations, the reverse is not true: accessibility to suburban populations do
not raise central city’s population in the long-run. Accessibility to suburban population
also harms long-run population in a given suburban locality, but in this case the
coefficient is not significant.
With these results, and using expression (7), we are able to assess the relevance of
direct vs. indirect spillovers. For example, as show Table 4, the direct effect on suburbs
output of a 1% increase in the city’s capital stock is 0.652. However, a 1% increase in
the city capital stock will raise city’s output by 0.540; as the effect of 1% increase of
city’s output in suburb’s output is 0.371, the indirect effect of city’s capital stock is
0.371×0.540=0.2. Therefore, 76% of public capital spillovers are direct (i.e.,
0.652/(0.652+0.2)) and the remaining 24% are indirect growth spillovers. In the case of
operating spending, direct effects are 0.310 and indirect effects are 0.371×0.775=0.29.
In this case, indirect growth spillovers are as important as direct spillovers.
5. Conclusions
This paper has presented some empirical evidence on two hypothesis: a) public services
provided by the central city foster growth in the suburbs, and b) growth in the central
city fosters growth in the suburbs. Regarding the first hypothesis, the results show that
increases in operating spending and the capital stock in the central city have positive
effects on long-run output growth in the suburbs. Operating spending in the suburbs
also has positive effects on output growth both in the suburbs and in the central city, but
the magnitude of these effects is much lower. Although this evidence is consistent with
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the existence of benefit spillovers, the results corresponding to other policy instruments
suggest that suburbs and central cities compete to attract economic activity. For
example, we have found positive effects of central city’s taxes and negative effects of
central city’s promotion spending on suburbs output growth. In this case the effects
caused by cities and suburbs’ have the same sign and similar magnitude. This means
that the competition effect occurs both among suburbs and between suburbs and the
central city. Some of these effects are also present in the case of population growth, but
in general, fiscal variables are less able to explain population than output growth.
Regarding the second hypothesis, the results show that output growth in the suburbs is
higher the higher is the output of the central city. Long-run population growth is also
higher the higher is central city’s population. Therefore, growth spillovers seem to be
also a relevant empirical fact, at least in the sample analysed. Moreover, the results
show that in this case the spillovers only go from the central city to the suburbs; there
are no spillovers from the suburbs to the central city or among suburbs.
The evidence provided in the paper may have important economic policy implications.
If central city’s services provide benefits (direct or indirect) to suburban residents and
firms, it may be of interest to them to guarantee that the central city is not in financial
trouble. Therefore, this evidence may be used by central city mayors to claim for
improvements in its funding system. In fact, unconditional transfers to Spanish
municipalities are currently under discussion. One the one hand, some people argue
about the need to keep the high population weights for big cities in the calculation of
expenditure needs. On the other hand, there is a proposal to reinforce the privileges of
big cities (those with more than 500 thousand inhabitants) and even to extent them to
the cities with more than 100 thousand inhabitants. The results of the paper can be used
to evaluate the effect of change in the design of that transfer, consisting in transferring
funds from the small localities in the suburbs to the central cities, but without changing
the total amount of the transfer.
To perform this simulation, note in Table 1 that the stock of capital and operating
spending per head are not very different in the suburbs and in the central city.
Therefore, if we assume that a change in transfers is fully converted to a change in
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expenditures24, the effect of a transfer of resources from the suburb to the central city
will have, more or less, the same per cent impact (but of opposite sign) on spending per
head. If we use the parameters in Table 4, a 1% increase in the capital stock of the
central city provokes a total (direct+indirect effect) increase of 0.852% in suburbs’
output, wile a 1% drop in suburbs capital stock provokes a reduction of only 0.24% in
suburbs’ output. If the adjustment is made through operating spending, the total
spillover effect provokes an increase of 0.6% in suburbs’ output, while the own effect
provokes a reduction of 0.2% in suburbs’ output. Therefore, not only the central city25
but also the suburbs would gain from the reallocation of transfers.
                                                          
24 This is only one of the possible policy simulation that can be conducted. The conclusions may change if
one assumes that increased funds to the central city must be financed with suburban taxes.
25 In the case of the central city, the own effect (0.775 for operating spending and 0.540 for the capital
stock) clearly dominates the direct spillover effect (0.141 for operating spending and 0.051 for the capital
stock; see Table 4). Note that in this case there are no indirect growth spillovers.
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Table 1:
Descriptive statistics,years 1992, 2001 and average 1992-2001.
Mean Standard Deviation
1992 2001 1992-2001 1992 2001 1992-2001
Suburbs:
     - Output (y) 116.80 172.84 140.63 182.29 216.92 215.62
     - Population  (p) 23,027 24,429 23,634 36,368 36,139 35,992
     -  Property tax rate 0.675 0.878 0.754 0.254 0.709 0.443
     -  Business tax rate 1.560 1.594 1.584 0.261 0.302 0.284
     -  Vehicle  tax rate: 1.297 1.515 1.431 0.229 0.177 0.223
     -  Operating spending/head.: 188.09 372.52 275.15 63.55 74.60 86.21
     -  Capital stock/ head 397.84 1,007.57 702.71 65.56 234.96 181.06
     -  % Spending on personal services 0.458 0.420 0.435 0.042 0.165 0.140
     -  % Spending on promotion 0.018 0.031 0.017 0.064 0.097 0.050
     - Land available/ head. 114.90 108.77 110.00 115.35 120.93 119.30
Central cities:
    - Output (y) 2,690.78 3,176.48 2,923.10 4,206.94 4,648.13 4,376.91
     - Population  (p) 394,792 414,607 410,123 583,049 574,620 572,628
     -  Property tax rate 0.655 0.767 0.705 0.210 0.271 0.249
     -  Business tax rate 1.450 1.475 1.460 0.446 0.467 0.453
     -  Vehicle  tax rate: 1.200 1.318 1.255 0.176 0.228 0.206
     -  Operating spending/ head. 232.59 357.98 270.34 110.03 135.70 124.46
     - Capital stock/ head 416.74 1,042.45 729.60 104.54 203.15 172.02
     -  % Spending on personal services 0.512 0.535 0.529 0.011 0.080 0.072
     -  % Spending on promotion 0.025 0.018 0.021 0.017 0.047 0.030
     - Land available/ head. 31.43 34.70 32.52 15.96 26.22 21.41
Notes:  Output is measured in thousand of euro, operating spending per capita and capital stock
per capita are measured in euro; the property tax rate is expressed in % but the other two tax rates
are coefficients that multiply minimum taxes, so they can not be interpreted as a %; land available
per capita is expressed in m
2
.
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Table 2: Variable definition and statistical sources
Definition Statistical sources
     - Output (y) GDP estimation called Market share
and computed  using a battery of
economic activity indicators
Anuario Económico de España:
Banesto-“La Caixa”,  various years
     - Population  (p) Population counts for 1996 and official
estimates for the other years
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE)
    -  Property tax rate Nominal tax rate (%) and adjustment
for years after a property value
reassessment campaign
Tax rates, year of reassesment and
number of urban properties taken from
the “Property tax  data file” from
Centro de Gestión Catastral,
Ministerio de Economía, various years
    -  Business tax rate “Tax burden coefficient”
    -  Vehicle  tax rate Tax rate on autos
Tipos impositivos y coeficientes de
los impuestos municipales,  Ministerio
de Economía, various years
    -  Operating spending/ head. Spending on personnel, materials and
current transfers; interest payments
excluded
“Municipal outlays data file”,
Ministerio de Economía, various years
    - Capital stock/ head Accumulated sum of investment made
by the locality since 1983, allowing for
a linear depreciation rate of 4%
“Municipal outlays data file”,
Ministerio de Economía, 1992-2001,
and “Municipal budget data file”,
1983-1991
    -  % Spending on personal services Operating spending on social services
(function 3 of the budget), health
(function 4.1), education (function 4.2),
and culture and sports (functions 4.4 and
4.5) over total operating spending
“Municipal outlays data file”,
Ministerio de Economía, various years
    -  % Spending on promotion Operating spending on promotion of
economic activities (functions 6 and 7 of
the budget)
“Municipal outlays data file”,
Ministerio de Economía
    - Land available/ head. Area of not developed urban land “Property tax data file” from
Centro de Gestión Catastral,
Ministerio de Economía
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Table 3: Results of the SURE estimation of the
Vector Error Correction  Model (VECM).(N=565, T=10)
Effects on suburbs: Effects on central city:
∆y ∆p ∆Y ∆P
i.- Own fiscal effects, suburbs:  z  (t-1)
       -  Property tax rate -0.027
(-3.124)**
-0.008
(-1.604)
--.-- --.--
       -  Business tax rate -0.031
(-1.430)
0.001
(0.333)
--.-- --.--
       -  Vehicle tax rate -0.017
(-1.867)*
-0.014
(-1.102)
--.-- --.--
       -  Operating spending/hab. 0.014
(1.775)*
0.012
(1.462)
--.-- --.--
       - Capital stock/hab 0.017
(2.002)**
0.008
(3.687)**
--.-- --.--
       -  % Spending on personal services -0.018
(-0.736)
0.006
(2.550)**
--.-- --.--
       -  % Spending on promotion 0.002
(0.939)
0.000
(0.020)
--.-- --.--
ii.- Own fiscal effects, central city: Z (t-1)
       -  Property tax rate --.-- --.-- -0.034
(-2.236)**
-0.034
(-1.302)
       -  Business tax rate --.-- --.-- -0.041
(-0.861)
-0.052
(-0.311)
       -  Vehicle tax rate --.-- --.-- -0.024
(-1.984)*
-0.019
(-0.905)
       -  Operating spending/hab. --.-- --.-- 0.065
(2.877)**
0.021
(1.854)*
       - Capital stock/hab --.-- --.-- 0.045
(2.632)**
0.004
(1.955)*
       -  % Spending on personal services --.-- --.-- 0.002
(0.888)
0.015
(1.965)*
       -  % Spending on promotion --.-- --.-- 0.003
(1.954)*
0.000
(0.101)
  iii.- Fiscal effects of suburbs:  z  (t-1)
       -  Property tax rate 0.088
(3.202)**
0.017
(1.441)
0.097
(2.112)**
0.025
(0.761)
       -  Business tax rate 0.046
(0.314)
0.011
(0.621)
0.061
(1.103)
0.064
(1.231)
       -  Vehicle tax rate 0.072
(2.354)**
0.030
(1.203)
0.126
(1.923)*
0.022
(0.984)
       -  Operating spending/hab. 0.015
(2.112)**
-0.003
(-2.441)**
0.012
(2.269)**
0.008
(0.711)
       - Capital stock/hab 0.010
(1.651)
0.007
(0.862)
0.004
(1.306)
-0.012
(-1.725)*
       -  % Spending on personal services 0.003
(0.666)
-0.005
(-2.412)**
-0.002
(-0.088)
-0.029
(-2.799)**
       -  % Spending on promotion -0.004
(-2.123)**
-0.000
(-0.428)
-0.003
(-2.300)**
0.000
(0.504)
  iv.- Fiscal effects of central city:  Z  (t-1)
       -  Property tax rate 0.074
(5.604)**
0.026
(2.623)**
--.-- --.--
       -  Business tax rate 0.068
(1.814)*
0.038
(0.901)
--.-- --.--
       -  Vehicle tax rate 0.083
(4.699)**
0.058
(4.011)**
--.-- --.--
       -  Operating spending/hab. 0.022
(4.870)**
-0.023
(-2.112)**
--.-- --.--
       - Capital stock/hab 0.046
(5.112)**
0.005
(0.944)
--.-- --.--
       -  % Spending on personal services -0.004
(-0.804)
-0.031
(-2.125)**
--.-- --.--
       -  % Spending on promotion -0.005
(-2.766)**
0.001
(0.244)
--.-- --.--
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Table 3: (continued)
Results of the SURE estimation of the
Vector Error Correction  Model (VCE).(N=565, T=10)
Effects on suburbs: Effects on central city:
∆y ∆p ∆Y ∆P
v.- Output
    Own effects, suburbs: y (t-1) -0.071
(-5.700)**
--.-- --.-- --.--
    Own effects, central city: Y (t-1) --.-- --.-- -0.084
(-2.116)**
--.--
    Effects of suburbs: y (t-1) -0.105
(-8.445)**
--.-- 0.014
(0.436)
--.--
    Effects of central city: Y (t-1) 0.016
(6.231)**
--.-- --.-- --.--
vi- Population
     Own effects, suburbs: p  (t-1) --.-- -0.052
(-2.325)**
--.-- --.--
     Own effects, central city: P (t-1) --.-- --.-- --.-- -0.112
(-2.223)**
     Effects of suburbs: p  (t-1) --.-- -0.046(-1.325)
--.-- -0.053
(-1.424)
     Effects of central city P  (t-1) --.-- 0.051
(1.721)*
--.-- --.--
vii.- Land availability
     Own effects, suburbs: n (t-1) 0.009
(5.112)**
0.009
(5.665)**
--.--
     Own effects, central city: N (t-1) --.-- --.-- 0.002
(1.324)
0.006
(1.625)
viii – Trends
    Suburbs:  dS × tt. 0.012
(8.123)**
0.006
(3.305)**
--.-- --.--
    Central city:  dC × tt. --.-- --.-- -0.003(-0.400)
0.003
(1.955)*
    Distance to central city: tij td ).100( ×
-0.006
(-2.236)**
-0.005
(-3.671)**
--.-- --.--
R2 0.544 0.514 0.666 0.595
Panel Durbin-Watson 1.985 1.833 2.100 2.110
LR. Test (variables in levels) 107.21** 97.05** 90.21** 87.25**
LR. Test. (neighbours’ population and output) 15.20** 17.31** 31.00** 29.34**
LR. Test  (own fiscal variables) 59.33** 33.45** 25.64** 10.18**
LR. Test. (neighbours’ fiscal variables) 69.65** 50.33** 46.39** 39.38
LR. Test (area trends) 98.47** 44.64** 55.94** 61.22**
LR. Test (individual effects) 69.11** 80.41** 69.10** 101.46**
LR. Test (3 to 2 lags) 8.26 8.20 7.34 3.27
LR. Test (2 to 1 lag) 30.64** 41.11** 35.11** 62.19**
Notes: (1) t-statistics are shown in parenthesis, **=statistically significant at the 95%
level, *=statistically significant at the 90% level, (2) Equations estimated as a system
after the elimination of individual effects, (3) Two lags of the differenced variables
included but not shown, (4) Specific area time trends included but not shown, (5) LR
tests performed equation by equation and distributed as a χ2(n) with n=number of
variables excluded, (6) The LR test on the joint significance of the individual effects ha
been performed on the LSDVresults.
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Table 4:
Long-run parameters
i.- Effects on output
i.1.- Effects on suburbs i.2.- Effects on central city
Own
effects ( z )
Effects of
suburbs ( z )
Effects of
central city ( Z )
Own
 effects ( Z )
Effects of
suburbs ( z )
 -  Property tax rate   -0.380  1.241
[0.248;   0.124]
 1.042
[0.208;  0.104]
  -0.400   1.151
[0.230;  0.115]
 -  Business tax rate  -0.440 0.655
[0.130;   0.065]
0.965
[0.192;  0.096]
 -0.492 0.733
[0.146;  0.073]
 -  Vehicle tax rate  -0.241   1.011
[0.202;   0.101]
1.170
[0.234;  0.117]
 -0.294  1.500
[0.300;  0.150]
 -  Operating spending/hab.   0.200   0.201
[0.040;   0.020]
0.310
[0.062;  0.031]
  0.775   0.141
[0.028;  0.014]
 - Capital stock/hab    0.240 0.141
[0.028;   0.014]
0.652
[0.130;  0.065]
 0.540 0.051
[0.010;  0.005]
 -  % Spending on pers. ser. -0.025 0.042
[0.008;   0.004]
          -0.062
   [-0.012;  -0.006]
0.025 -0.023
[-0.004;  -0.002]
 -  % Spending on promotion  0.032  -0.062
[-0.012;  -0.006]
         -0.070
   [-0.014; - 0,007]
 0.043    -0.045
[-0.009;  -0.004]
-  Output --.-- -1.050
[-0.210;  -0.105]
0.371
[0.074;  0.037]
--.-- 0.170
[0.034;  0.017]
ii.- Effects on population
ii.1.- Effects on suburbs ii.2.- Effects on central city
Own
effects ( z )
Effects of
suburbs ( z )
Effects of
central city ( Z )
Own
 effects ( Z )
Effects of
suburbs ( z )
 -  Property tax rate -0.150 0.333
[0.066;   0.033]
0.500
[0.100;  0.050]
-0.300 0.225
[0.044;  0.022]
 -  Business tax rate 0.020 0.211
[0.042;   0.021]
0.730
[0.146;  0.073]
-0.461 0.571
[0.114;  0.057]
 -  Vehicle tax rate -0.273 0.584
[0.116;   0.058]
1.120
[0.224;  0.112]
-0.142 0.200
[0.040;  0.020]
 -  Operating spending/hab. 0.048 -0.065
[-0.013;  -0.006]
-0.444
[-0.088;  -0.044]
 0.041 -0.070
[-0.014;  -0.007]
 - Capital stock/hab    0.154 0.131
[0.026;   0.013]
0.100
[0.020;  0.010]
  0.194 0.071
[0.014;  0.007]
 -  % Spending on pers. ser.   0.121 -0.101
[-0.020;  -0.010]
-0.602
[-0.120;  -0.060]
  0.131 -0.260
[0.052;  -0.026]
 -  % Spending on promotion 0.000 -0.000
[0.000;   0.000]
0.021
[0.004;  0.002]
 0.000 0.000
[0.000;  0.000]
 -  Population --.-- -0.881
[-0.176;  -0.088]
0.981
[0.196;  0.098]
--.-- -0.472
[-0.094;  -0.047]
Notes: (1) Values shown are long-run elasticities, identified by dividing parameters of Table 3 by the
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in each equation, (2) Bold numbers indicate that the
elasticities are statistically significant at the 95% or at the 90% levels, (3) Numbers in brackets are
elasticities computed at distances of 5 and 10 km, respectively.
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